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I. INTRODUCTION

Few topics command headlines or galvanize public attention
as does child abuse and neglect. As a result of well-publicized and
tragic cases, legislation is being enacted at an unprecedented rate.
Yet this concern is fairly recent; North Carolina's child abuse reporting statute traces its lineage only to 1965.1 Her sister states
* Judge, District Court of North Carolina, Judicial District 19-A. A.B. 1962,
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill; LL.B. 1965, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Janet Mason of the Institute of Government and Bonnie Busby, Attorney for the Rowan County Department of Social Services, who read the manuscript, corrected errors and suggested changes, and Robert L. Warren, Chief District Judge, Judicial District 19A, who furnished both background and ideas for this article.
1. Act of May 11, 1965, ch. 472, 1965 N.C. Sess. Laws 533; See Mason, Abuse
and Negligence of Children and Disabled Adults: North Carolina'sMandatory
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also enacted similar abuse reporting statutes during that same decade, a period of increasing public awareness and medical knowledge. A great deal of the attention was generated by a medical
phrase-"battered child syndrome"-which became a rallying cry
for proponents of protective legislation.2
The decade of the 1960s also saw the United States Supreme
Court extend due process protections to juvenile offenders.3 As a
result, a juvenile code was recommended to the 1969 General Assembly by the North Carolina Courts Commission; it was adopted
and became effective on January 1, 1970, and implemented the
mandated procedural safeguards while incorporating juvenile juris4
diction into the District Court.
The Juvenile Code Revision Committee was created by the
1977 General Assembly as an adjunct of the Governor's Crime
Commission. 5 As the result of legislation sponsored by that Committee in 1979, a new juvenile code was adopted for North Carolina.' Although significant due process protections were extended
to the juvenile offender, the new Code was presented as making a
contribution to "the control of crime in North Carolina," and little
attention was given to the problem of intervention in abuse and
neglect cases. In the area of termination of parental rights, for example, the Committee did not have time to "adequately investigate," and therefore recommended few changes in the existing
law. 7 No criticism is intended of the Committee; this merely illustrates the primary position held by the problem of the delinquent
Reporting Laws, PoPULAR GOVERNMENT, Spring 1983, at 1.
2. Thomas, Child Abuse and Neglect, Part 1: Historical Overview, Legal
Matrix and Social Perspectives, 50 N.C.L. REv. 293, 330 (1972); Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children:A Search for Realistic Standards,
27 STAN. L. REV. 985, 986 (1975); See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
A MANUAL FOR JUDGES
13-26 (1981) (discussing reporting laws and the use of central registries) [hereinaf-

HUMAN SERVICES, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT LITIGATION,

ter cited as MANUAL].

3.

Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967);

See Gilman, IJA/ABA Juvenile Justice Standards Project: An Introduction, 57
B.U.L. REV. 617, 618-19 (1977).
4. Thomas, Juvenile Justice in Transition-A New Juvenile Code for
North Carolina, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 2 (1980).
5.

NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CRIME CONTROL & PUBLIC SAFETY, THE

FINAL REPORT OF THE JUVENILE CODE REVISION COMMITTEE, at i [hereinafter
as FINAL REPORT]; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-480(c)(5)-(6) (1978).
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-516 to -732 (1981).
7. FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 324.
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juvenile during that time.
Despite the virtual explosion of children's rights legislation,
there is no unanimity of opinion among either child care professionals or laymen as to how far government should intrude into the
family unit. Advocates of parental rights question what are viewed
as largely standardless interventions into family autonomy, ably
arguing that the courts have intervened too often and too quickly,
substituting the predominatly middle-class values of the intervening agencies and courts for those of the parents.8 The reporting
laws have reflected a "policy to strengthen the child's own home
through state resources and services to parents so that removal
[would] not be necessary for effective child protection." 9 We have
fallen far short of that ideal. In a far-reaching analysis in 1972,
Mason P. Thomas, Jr., of the Institute of Government, warned:
Children are sometimes taken from their homes too hastily.
A typical response to neglect and abuse cases seems to be swift
removal of the child from his home, followed by confusion and
placements of the child in a series of foster homes, after which he
is often returned to his parents.10
A decade later, Mr. Thomas' insight has been confirmed by
practicing professionals and the literature. In an excess of caring,
we have harmed some of the children we sought to protect. Tormented by ambivalent feelings, we have agonized and procrastinated over the decision to terminate parental rights, so as to free
children for adoption or permanent placement. In our indecision,
proximately resulting from the lack of meaningful standards, we
have sentenced those children to indeterminate years in foster
care, their release dates subject to the availability of legal assistance to prosecute the action for termination, subject to the decision of a judge whose predilections may make it difficult for him or
her to sever the parental knot, and subject to the burdensome
caseload or individual viewpoint of the social worker assigned to
8.

GOVERNOR'S ADVOCACY COUNCIL ON CHILDREN AND YOUTH, ACTING ON BE-

CHILDREN iii, 4 (1983) [hereinafter cited as ENDANGERED
Wald, supra note 2, at 1001; Rogers, The State vs. the Family: Does
Intervention Really Spare the Child?, 28 MERCER L. REV. 547, 548 (1977); Lowry,
The Judge v. The Social Worker: Can Arbitrary Decision-making be Tempered
by the Courts?, 52 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1033, 1034 (1977).
HALF OF ENDANGERED
CHILDREN];

9. Thomas, supra note 2, at 348.
10. Thomas, supra note 2, at 347.
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the case. 1
As early as 1972, Mason Thomas had called for state legislation to "clarify the bases for intervention ....

"12

In a 1978 study,

the Governor's Advocacy Council on Children and Youth
(GACCY) recommended that the State Social Services Commission
"establish standards for removal of a child from his home."' 3 In
1979, the Juvenile Code Revision Committee recommended that
"the Department of Human Resources should establish standards
to deal with identification, prevention, treatment, and intervention" in meeting the problem of child abuse and neglect. 4
When the Governor's Advocacy Council on Children and
Youth felt that no efforts were being made to meet the call for
standards, it formed a Committee on Foster Care Standards to address the problem. The Committee's conclusions, after two years of
study, are embodied in its report, "Acting on Behalf of Endangered Children," released in June, 1983.15 Following its acceptance
of the Committee Report, GACCY has now strongly urged implementation of the committee recommendations by the 1985 General
Assembly."8
The statutory changes recommended by the Committee on
Foster Care Standards were modified somewhat as the result of
meetings held between representatives of that Committee and a
committee of local and state social services representatives. 17 It is
anticipated that the draft of proposed legislation will be submitted
to review by other child advocacy organizations and interested
11. Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisalof the
State's Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEO. L.J. 887 (1975); Ketcham
& Babcock, Statutory Standards for the Involuntary Termination of Parental
Rights, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 530, 553 (1976); ENDANGERED CHILDREN, supra note 8,
at iii.
12. Thomas, supra note 2, at 347.
13. GOVERNOR'S ADVOCACY COUNCIL ON CHILDREN AND YOUTH, WHY CAN'T I
HAVE A HOME?: FOSTER CARE AND ADOPTION IN NORTH CAROLINA 27 (1978) [hereinafater cited as HOME].
14. FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 34.
15. ENDANGERED CHILDREN, supra note 8.
16. P. HOLLAND, J. NIBLOCK AND W. REAGAN, PROMISES TO KEEP, A REPORT ON
FOSTER CARE AND ADOPTION IN NORTH CAROLINA 1, 2 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
PROMISES].

17. Memorandum from Janet Mason of the Institute of Government, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the District Court Judges' Committee,
on Endangered Children (May 29, 1984). Other changes in the draft of statutory
changes resulted from review by a committee of district court judges.
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groups before submission to the 1985 General Assembly. It is not,
therefore, the purpose of this comment to examine the myriad of
details attendant to any significant code amendment, but to examine the broad changes which the proposed standards would
make in the present child-protection and foster care system, and to
suggest additional areas in which further study is needed.
The proposed standards, as they are incorporated in the proposed legislation, require a searching look at our present attitudes
towards children and families in trouble, and "[h]ard decisions
must be made.... ."I' The new concepts embody a totally different
perspective, even a new nomenclature. There are two major thrusts
to the proposed legislation: the first encompasses standards for intervention in families, removing children from their homes and returning them there; the second deals with standards for termination of parental rights.
The proposed standards for North Carolina share some of the
language of the Standards Relating to Abuse and Neglect promulgated by the Juvenile Justice Standards Project of the Institute of
Judicial Administration and the American Bar Association (IJA/
ABA Standards), 9 along with certain basic concepts and assumptions; therefore, some of the literature discussing the IJA/ABA
Standards is referred to below.
II.

PROPOSED STANDARDS FOR INTERVENTION IN FAMILIES,

FROM THEIR HOMES,
CHILDREN HOME

REMOVAL OF CHILDREN

AND RETURNING

The impetus for developing standards for removing children
from, and returning them to, their homes was the GACCY report,
"Why Can't I Have a Home? '2 0 There being no mandated or uniform criteria for removal and return, analysis of available data revealed that "the individual characteristics of the child, the family,
or the abuse incident were less important in the decision to place
the child in foster care than the identity of the social service
agency or the court involved. ' 21 Once in foster care, the lack of
standards left many children adrift, so that the average time spent
in foster care was about four years with no plan for the child's
18.
19.

ENDANGERED CHILDREN,
ENDANGERED CHILDREN,

supra note 8, at iii.
supra note 8,at 2.

20. HOME, supra note 13.
21.

ENDANGERED CHILDREN,

supra note 8, at 1.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1984

5

Campbell
Law Review,LAW
Vol. 7, Iss.
2 [1984], Art. 2
CAMPBELL
REVIEW

[Vol. 7:145

future for half that time.2 2
"Foster care drift" became a much publicized phrase, and emphasis was placed on permanency planning, to insure each child a
stable placement if he or she could not be returned to his home.
The report's emphasis on permanency planning has already borne
fruit; since 1978, the
number of foster children, even in harsh economic times, has
dropped to the lowest level in a decade. It has decreased 31%,
while the total child population has dropped only 3%. The length
of time children stay in foster care has been reduced from almost
four years in 1978 to about three and one-half years in 1982. The
number of children in child-caring institutions (formerly orphanages) has dropped from 1,145 to 793. The number of children
awaiting legal services to be freed for adoption has decreased
from 175 children in 64 counties to 78 children in 94 counties in
1982. To some extent, children are being placed in foster care today for more serious reasons than in 1978.2"
Despite the admitted progress, the GACCY Committee is concerned with prevention of what it styles "arbitrary and unnecessary initial placements that break up families and start children
into the foster care system."' 4 Thus, in the decade from the identification of the "battered child syndrome," foster care's image
changed from that of the panacea we had imagined it to be, to a
25
perceived evil which could actually result in harm to the child.
The situation may be partially explained by the overreaction of the
1960s when most children adjudged to be neglected were removed
from their homes. 26 There were few services to be offered to pro22. HOME, supra note 13, at vi-vii; Areen, supra note 11, at 887; Wald, State
Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Standardsfor Removal of Children from their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and
Termination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REv. 623, 626-27 (1976) ("the ex-

isting foster care system is not, in fact, a temporary one. There is probably a 50
percent chance that a child will remain in foster care for three years or more.")
23. PROMISES, supra note 16, at i.
24. ENDANGERED CHILDREN, supra note 8, at v.
25. Thomas, supra note 2, at 347-48; Wald, supra note 2, at 993-94; Areen,
supra note 11, at 889; Lowry, supra note 8, at 1036.
26. Areen, supra note 11, at 928 ("Separation of a child from his parents is
the most common result of a declaration that a child is neglected. In most states,
statutes authorize other dispositions, but courts generally avoid these alternatives,
either because the fear of the publicity which might result if a child is returned
and injured outweighs concern about the drawbacks of removal, or because resources to protect the child if removal is not effected are not available.").
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tect the child in his home, and no judge or social worker relished
leaving a child in a "bad" home, particularly in light of the occasional tragedies resulting from a child being returned to, or left in,
a home where abuse had been documented.2 7 Writers have suggested that "[j]udges and social workers sometimes develop 'rescue
fantasies' in well-intentioned efforts to save helpless children from
bad parents. 2 8 Others point to a lack of training for both social
29
workers and juvenile judges.

It is generally considered, however, that the lack of standards
delineating situations in which a child should be removed from his
home is the principal culprit. Statutes in almost every jurisdiction
are purposely vague, in order to allow the court the widest range of
discretion in dealing with these multi-faceted cases.30 Although the
grant of flexibility has been widely upheld in light of the interest
involved (protection of a helpless child from harm), critics have
complained that present laws are so vague that parents are not
given fair warning about what their conduct should be.-" Class distinctions become involved, since most courts and social workers are
non-minority middle-class citizens, and the members of families
usually involved in neglect proceedings are not. The danger that
their child-rearing practices will be held deficient is obvious.3 2 The
27. See generally MANUAL, supra note 2, at 181-89 (discussing the problems
of media coverage and public reaction as they affect the courts).
28. Wald, supra note 2, at 1005 n.117; Thomas, supra note 2, at 347-48.
29. P. DECOURcY, A SILENT TRAGEDY: CHILD ABUSE IN THE COMMUNITY 11-12
(1973); Levine, Caveat Parens:A Demystification of the Child Protective System,
35 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 33 (1973) (complaining that the courts are too reliant on the
child welfare professionals because of the "myth of agency expertise"); id. at 34
("In acting symbiotically with the child welfare agencies, the courts have assumed
'coloration of social agencies.' "); HOME, supra note 13, at x; PROMISES, supra note
16, at 3; see generally FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 97-101 (discussing recommendations for training juvenile judges).
30. Wald, supra note 2, at 1000-04.
31. Id. at 1001 n.96; Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)
("It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness, if
its prohibitions are not clearly defined"); see also Alsager v. District Court of Polk
County (Juvenile Div.), 406 F. Supp. 10, 18 (S.D. Iowa 1975), aff'd, 545 F. 2d 1137
(8th Cir. 1976) ("The initial danger present in a vague statute is the absence of
fair warning. Citizens should be able to guide their conduct by the literal meaning
of phrases expressed on the face of statutes.").
32. Wald, supra note 2, at 1001-02 ("Because the statutes do not reflect a
considered analysis of what types of harm justify the risks of intervention, decisionmaking is left to the ad hoc analysis of social workers and judges. There is
substantial evidence that their decisions often reflect personal values about chil-
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ultimate result of vague statutory standards is that well-intentioned courts and social workers, without a clear legislative mandate, are left to balance the interests of the family in remaining
intact, with the possiblility of future harm to the child, with little
guidance except experience. Concern for the child's safety has
generally led to a swift removal from the home, followed by relief,
confusion, indecision and-until recently-the chance that the
stay in foster care would stretch into years. 4
The inclusion of so many cases within the penumbra of coercive protection has merely diluted the necessary resources so that
few cases receive intensive treatment.3 6 Low financial rewards in a
demanding profession cause constant turnover in social worker
staffs.3 6 This in turn exacerbates the problem, as new caseworkers
must reestablish communication with the child and family, depriving the child of a continuity of supervision, and often delaying the
decision to either return the child home or terminate parental
rights and thus free the child for adoption. 37 Thus, the sheer
weight of numbers makes our child protection system one in which
the child may actually be harmed rather than helped.
When a child is removed from the home, "[p]erhaps the most
subtle, but powerful, effect of immediate fostering is that relief
from worry about his safety tempts everyone to allow the fostering
to continue too long, and indeed to create a treatment plan based
on long-term fostering."3 8 Nor is there any guarantee that the foster home will be superior to the child's natural home. 3 Even if the
physical plant is superior, psychiatrists now recognize the harm
drearing, which are not supported by scientific evidence, and which result in removing children from environments in which they are doing adequately."); ENDANGERED CHILDREN, supra note 8, at iii.
33.

INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION/AMERICAN

BAR AsSOCIATION, JU-

VENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT, STANDARDS RELATING TO AHUSE AND NEGLECT,

Commentary, pt. 1.2, at 53 (1981) [hereinafter cited as STANDARDS].
34. See supra notes 22 and 23.
35. See Wald, supra note 2, at 1007 (pointing out that limited intervention
insures that our limited resources go to those in the most danger); accord Mc-

Cathren, Accountability in the Child Protection System: A Defense of the Proposed Standards Relating to Abuse and Neglect, 57 B.U.L. REv. 707, 716-17
(1977).
36. P. DECOURCY, supra note 29, at 15; R. KEMPE & C. KEMPE, CHILD ABUSE
115 (1978); HOME, ,supra note 13, at x.
37. HOME, supra note 13, at x, xi.
38. R. KEMPE & C. KEMPE, supra note 36, at 98.
39. Id. at 98-100; see supra note 25.
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caused a child by separation even from an "unfit" parent.4 0
The argument which most strongly militates against the
standardless utilization of foster care is that unwarranted intervention violates the family's right to autonomy. "The integrity of the
family unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, . . . the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, . . .and the Ninth Amendment .
"..."41
The right to rear one's children has been characterized by the
United States Supreme Court as "essential," 42 "basic," 4 3 and
"more precious . . .than property rights."' 44 Even those who have
not been "model" parents do not lose their fundamental interest in
5
the care and rearing of their children.4
In drafting proposed statutory changes for North Carolina, the
Committee on Foster Care Standards sought to balance all of the
above concerns against the right of protection of the child, remaining dedicated to "family autonomy and integrity," but placing
"paramount importance on the protection of the child. ' 46 In order
to fully understand the impact of the proposed amendments to the
Juvenile Code, it is necessary to understand the philosophical bases underlying them:
In summary, the committee's philosophy is to keep the child in
the family as long as the child's safety can be reasonably assured,
and thus protect both the child and the family's rights to autonomy; remove the child only when the child's safety cannot be reasonably assured; expend all available resources to rectify the
problem in the family so that the child may be returned to the
family as soon as it is safe to do this; and, if the child cannot be
returned to the family within a certain period of time (predetermined, based on the child's sense of time at a given age), terminate the parental rights so that the child's now paramount need
for permanency may be met through an adoptive family.' 7
The goals of the Committee are thus similar to those underly40. Wald, supra note 2, at 993-94; Kiser, Termination of Parental
Rights-Suggested Reforms and Responses, 16 J. FAM.L. 239, 247 (1977-1978).

41. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
42. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
43. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).

44. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953).
45. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
46. ENDANGERED CHILDREN, supra note 8, at 2.
47. Id.
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ing the IJA/ABA Standards on Abuse and Neglect, 4 and the
greater weight of professional opinion.49
III.

PROPOSED STATUTORY CHANGES

Under the present Juvenile Code in North Carolina, a child
may be taken into
temporary custody without a court order by a law-enforcement
officer or a Department of Social Services worker if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the juvenile is abused, neglected,
or dependent and that he would be injured or could not be taken
into custody if it were first necessary to obtain a court order.50

Once a petition is filed alleging that a juvenile is abused, neglected,
or dependent, a judge may place the juvenile in nonsecure custody
pursuant to the criteria of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-574 (1981), removing him from the home pending a full hearing if the judge "finds it
48. STANDARDS, supra note 33, at 3:
The proposed system is designed to achieve four major goals: to allow
intervention only where there is reason to believe that coercive intervention will in fact benefit the child, given the knowledge available about
children's needs and the means of helping children, and taking into consideration the resources likely to be available to help children; to insure
that when intervention occurs, every effort is made to keep children with
their parents, or if this is impossible, to provide them with a stable living
situation conducive to their well-being; to insure that procedures are followed which facilitate making appropriate decisions; and to insure that
all decisionmakers are held accountable for their actions.
49. See generally Areen, supra note 11; Thomas, supra note 2; Wald, supra
note 2; Rogers, supra note 8; P. D.COURCY, supra note 29.
Wald, supra note 22, at 637:
To summarize my conclusions, I propose that neglect statutes be revised
to allow intervention only when a child has suffered or is likely to suffer
certain serious harms. When intervention is needed to protect a child,
the child should be left in her own home unless she cannot be protected
from the specific harm justifying intervention without removal. If a child
must be removed, intensive services should be provided to reunite the
family and the child should be returned when she will no longer be endangered in her home, not when it is in her 'best interest' to return.
However, to prevent children from remaining in permanent foster care,
parental rights should be terminated and a permanent placement provided for most children under age three at the time of removal after six
months of placement if the child cannot be returned home at that time.
For children over three termination would occur if they cannot be returned home after one year in placement.
50. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-571(3) (1981).
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necessary." " If a juvenile is adjudicated to be abused, neglected or
dependent, the court may remove him from his home if he finds
the same to be "in the best interest of the juvenile,

52

and also

finds that the juvenile needs placement or more adequate care or
supervision.
The Committee on Foster Care Standards seeks to implement
its goal of maintaining family integrity by sharply reducing the jurisdiction of the District Court to order removal from the home.
Although the terms "abused juvenile" and "neglected juvenile" are
retained for the purposes of the largely unchanged reporting requirements of the Code, 53 a new term-"endangered juvenile"-is
created for the purpose of defining the level of harm which must
be present before the courts may coercively intervene in the family
by removing a child. There may also be intervention in the case of
a dependent juvenile-defined as one who has no parent, guardian
or custodian available to be responsible for his care or supervision-and in the case of a juvenile who has been in foster care for
180 days pursuant to a voluntary placement agreement.4 In those
cases there either is no available family in which to intervene, or
the family's integrity has already been interrupted by the voluntary placement, and the above philosophical considerations do not
apply. The definitions of "delinquent" and "undisciplined"
juveniles are unchanged by the proposal, although dispositional alternatives available to the court are affected.

5

The remainder of

this discussion relates only to changes affecting children alleged to
be abused or neglected.
The heart of the proposed changes is found in the definition of
endangered juvenile, proposed to read as follows:
(29) Endangered Juvenile.-Any juvenile who
a. Has suffered, or is at substantial risk of suffering, a physical
harm, inflicted non-accidentlly by the juvenile's parent,
guardian, custodian or caretaker, that causes or creates a substantial risk of causing disfigurement, impairment of bodily
51. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-574 (Supp. 1983).
52. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-647 (1981).
53. Draft of Statutory Changes to Implement Standards for Removal (January, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Draft]; J. Mason, Summary of Proposed Legislation to Implement Recommendations of the GACCY Committee on Foster Care
Standards Contained in "Acting on Behalf of Endangered Children," at 1 (July,
1984).
54. Draft, supra note 53, at 15.
55. Id. at 12-13.
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functioning, or other serious physical injury; or
Has suffered, or is at substantial risk of suffering, physical
harm causing disfigurement, impairment of bodily functioning or other serious physical injury as a result of conditions
created by the juvenile's parent, guardian, custodian or caretaker, or by the failure or inability of the parent, guardian,
custodian or caretaker to adequately supervise, care for or
protect the juvenile; or
Is suffering serious emotional damage caused or allowed by
the juvenile's parent, guardian, custodian or caretaker who is
unable or unwilling to authorize or provide or participate in
needed treatment for the juvenile; or
Has been abandoned; or
Has suffered, or is at substantial risk of suffering, sexual
abuse in that the juvenile's parent, guardian, custodian or
caretaker has (1) committed, permitted or encouraged the
commission of vaginal intercourse, any sexual act, or any offense against public morality and decency provided for in Article 26, Chapter 14, by, with or or upon the juvenile in violation of law, or (2) committed, permitted or encouraged any
act of prostitution with or by the juvenile; or
Needs medical treatment to cure, alleviate, or prevent serious
physical harm which may result in death, disfigurement, or
substantial impairment of bodily functions, and the juvenile's
parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker is unwilling or unable to provide or consent to the medical treatment; or
Is committing delinquent or criminal acts as a result of the
encouragement, guidance, indifference, or approval of the juvenile's parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker."

Although the proposed definition of "endangered juvenile" is
similar to that of "abused" and "neglected" juveniles in the present code, even a cursory examination reveals the necessity for
heightened levels of harm, present or threatened, before a juvenile
falls within the parameters of the proposed standards relating to
the dispositional alternative of removal. Both physical injury and
emotional damage must be serious before the court's removal powers are invoked.57 This is based on the assumption that in the less
serious cases, a juvenile would be harmed more by separation from
56. Id. at 3-4.
57. STANDARDS, supra note 33, Commentary, pt. 2.1 (A), at 63-64; Bourne &
Newberger, "Family Autonomy" or "Coercive Intervention'?, Ambiguity and
Conflict in the Proposed Standardsfor Child Abuse and Neglect, 57 B.U.L. REv.
670, 673 (1977).
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his parents than by allowing him to remain in the home, 58 and that
such cases should be handled by offering services to the intact
family.
Since the present definitions of abused and neglected juveniles
are retained (with minor changes) for reporting purposes, the Director of the Department of Social Services would be authorized to
intervene, as he does now, to exercise his responsibilities under the
reporting law. 9 Identification and prevention of harm to the child
is deemed to justify this intervention into the family, including the
power of the court to order the custodian of the child to cooperate
in the investigation.60
If his investigation reveals abuse or neglect, the Director is to
provide for protective services designed to remove the identified
harm to the child;6' if the custodian of the child refuses to accept
the offered services, then the Director may invoke the court's jurisdiction by filing a petition alleging the applicable facts.6 2 Where
immediate removal seems necessary, a protective services worker
may assume temporary custody of an endangered child. Thus, even
where abuse or neglect is found, a child may not be removed from
the home unless the heightened requirement of "endangerment" is
present. The present procedure for issuance of a nonsecure custody
order by the court is retained; however, if the court orders that the
juvenile be held for more than five days, it must find in its order
"whether reasonable efforts have been made to prevent or eliminate the need for placement of the juvenile, and may provide for
services or other efforts aimed at returning the juvenile home
promptly."6
After a hearing, if abuse or neglect is found by clear and convincing evidence, the court may have the juvenile supervised in his
own home or may place him in the custody of a parent; only where
the juvenile is found to be endangered as defined in sections (a)
through (g) above, may the court consider removing him from the
home for placement with someone other than a parent.6 4 Even
58. Wald, supra note 2, at 993: "[Tlhere is substantial evidence that, except
in cases involving very seriously harmed children, we are unable to improve a
child's situation through coercive state intervention."
59. Draft, supra note 53, at 5.
60. Id. at 6.
61. Id. at 5.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 9.
64. Id. at 10-11.
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then, there must be findings that removal from the home is necessary to protect the juvenile from further endangerment. In an order of removal, the court must include findings as to whether reasonable efforts were made to avoid removal, "and may include
provisions for services to be provided or other efforts to be made to
facilitate the juvenile's early return home. 6' 5 If the juvenile is
placed with the Department of Social Services, the Department
must file a written plan within thirty days after the removal of the
juvenile from his home, which must indicate among other things
"what steps will be taken to return the juvenile home ... ."
If a juvenile remains in an out-of-home placement, a review
hearing is mandated within six months of the date of his removal
from the home. At that hearing, the juvenile must be returned
home unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that
it is in the best interest of the juvenile that he not be returned
home; the burden of proof is on the petitioner at such hearings. At
a second review hearing, it is deemed to be in the best interest of
the juvenile to be returned home unless the court finds he is likely
to be endangered.6
The statutory changes proposed thus present an unified, wellreasoned approach implementing the Committee's philosophy that
only when a child cannot be protected from specific harms in the
home should he be removed, and when removed he should be returned as soon as the endangering conditions can be remedied. The
approach recognizes that the interest of the child in a permanent
placement and that of the family in autonomy are substantially
identical until parental unfitness is proven. 8
Proponents of this approach foresee two major benefits: (1)
the likelihood of "arbitrary and unnecessary" initial placements
will be lessened, and (2) scarce social service resources will be concentrated on the most serious cases.6 9 It is admitted that the courts
might be prevented from:
ordering protective services in individual cases in which a benefit
would result. Yet the majority of children excluded from juvenile
65. Id. at 11.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 14. For a discussion of the factors to be considered in determining
who has the burden of proof as to future endangerment, see Wald, supra note 22,
at 687-88; see Bourne & Newberger, supra note 57, at 685-86.
68. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 761 (1982).
69. Supra note 35.
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court jurisdiction under the proposed scheme, as well as those included, will realize tangible benefits as a result of limiting state
intervention. Accordingly, the sum of the benefits to be enjoyed
by all children outweighs the harm that may result in individual
70
cases.
Drafters of the IJA/ABA Standards agree that in a given case,
the proposals would not necessarily produce the best result for a
child, as there are fewer options open to the courts and social
workers. It is expected that the interests of most children would be
protected by limiting the discretion of those in decisionmaking
positions. 1
Critics of the IJA/ABA Standards have ably depicted the resulting dilemma:
The family situation in which a child suffers nonserious harm is
not only not 'ideal', it is quite oppressive, albeit without danger to
life and limb of the child. The child will consistently suffer specific, demonstrable physical or emotional harm, even though such
harm does not rise to the gravity required by the Standards nor
present a 'substantial risk that the child will imminently suffer'
such severe harm. An example of parental abuse constituting nonserious harm would be a child who regularly receives painful
bruises in the course of parental discipline. Nonserious harm attributable to parental neglect would include some 'failure to
72
thrive' cases.
Thus, the first of the "hard" questions we must ask is whether
we are willing to tolerate a certain level of what we have called
"child abuse" in the past. It is obvious that under the decreased
jurisdictional grant embodied in the Act, the court would intervene
by removal only in what must be considered rather serious cases.
The term "serious injury" is not defined, but we may find some
guidance in the commentary to the IJA/ABA Standards on Abuse
and Neglect, in which "serious" is equated with "significant"; thus
the standards distinguish between cases involving severe and permanent damage, and those characterized as resulting in "minor
bruises. ' 'T7 We may also find "serious injury" as used in the North
Carolina assault statutes, and the cases defining the term will be
helpful; thus, we must look to the particular facts of each case to
70. McCathren, supra note 35, at 709-10.
71. STANDARDS, supra note 33, Introduction, at 6.
72. Bourne & Newberger, supra note 57, at 674.
73. STANDARDS, supra note 33, pt. 2.1 (A), Commentary, at 64.
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determine whether a serious injury has occurred, according to our
decisions.74 It is not essential that the victim have been hospitalized,75 and we may consider the painful effect that the injury, such
as a "whiplash" injury, had on the victim. 76 The juvenile court
would thus have to consider the totality of circumstances surrounding the injuries, particularly the age of the child involved, as
the majority of deaths resulting from abuse occur in children less
than two years of age. 7 The failure-to-thrive syndrome is most
commonly found in the first two years of a child's life.78
Supporters of the proposed changes, while agreeing that in
some cases a child might be left in surroundings we would now
remove him from, find solace in the expectation that parents will
seek voluntary help in many situations involving nonserious harm,
although others find that an empty hope. 79 One obstacle to voluntary requests for assistance in a family in jeopardy has been the
threat, express or implied, of criminal prosecution."0 Although the
problem is not addressed in this legislation, future study groups
may wish to study the advisability of prosecution in abuse cases
where a member of the immediate family is alleged to be the perpetrator. There is a low rate of sucessful prosecution in those cases
since the victims are often too young and frightened to testify, and
since experience shows that during the time period between indictment and trial, the family often "settles" its problems and brings
such pressure on the minor child or the non-indicted parent that a
prosecution may not be possible in the most aggravated cases.8 1
Equally as serious, the juvenile court proceeding may be held in
abeyance pending the resolution of criminal charges.8 " There is an
equally respectable body of opinion supporting the use of criminal
prosecution in child abuse and neglect cases both for its deterrent
and rehabilitative effects, and to ensure police involvement and in74. See, e.g., State v. Marshall, 5 N.C. App. 476, 168 S.E. 2d 487 (1969);
State v. Parker, 7 N.C. App. 191, 171 S.E. 2d 665 (1970).
75. State v. Joyner, 295 N.C. 55, 243 S.E. 2d 367 (1978).
76. State v. Ferguson, 261 N.C. 558, 135 S.E. 2d 626 (1964).
77. MANUAL, supra note 2, at 4.
78. R. KEMPE & C. KEMPE, supra note 36, at 29-30.
79. McCathren, supra note 35, at 713-17 (discussing the benefits of voluntary services); Bourne & Newberger, supra note 57, at 675-83 (disagreeing with

the ban on all services in cases of nonserious harm).
80. STANDARDS, supra note 33, pt. 9.1, Commentary, at 181.
81. Mason, supra note 1, at 4-5; MANUAL, supra note 2, at 142-51.
82. MANUAL, supra note 2, at 144.
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vestigation.8 3 Also, the force of public opinion is aroused by
graphic publicity in some cases, particularly in sexual abuse cases,
and prosecution may be demanded.""
The scope of this problem is beyond the scope of this review;
it would seem advisable in the future, however, to consider (1) the
commencement of criminal abuse proceedings only with the advice
and consent of the judge assigned to the juvenile case and the
prosecutor, and (2) the appointment of an attorney or guardian ad
litem for the child-victim to partially shield him from the family
pressures which often surface in those matters.8 5
Nor can we ignore the financial aspects of the present situation, and this proposed remedy. We must be either prepared to
allocate sufficient resources from already-strained budgets to meet
the problem head-on, or recognize that limited resources are available, which best can be used in the more serious cases where some
beneficial permanent results might be obtained, rather than the
present hopeless dilution of services resulting in a temporary cosmetic effect.8 6

IV.

PROPOSED STANDARDS FOR TERMINATION OF PARENTAL
RIGHTS

"Few consequences of judicial action are so grave as the severance of natural family ties. Even the convict committed to prison
and thereby deprived of his physical liberty often retains the love
' '87
and support of family members.
The gravity of this action, in which parental rights to a child
are "completely and permanently" terminated,8 8 has caused many
courts to be reluctant to terminate parental rights in even the
83. Supra note 81; see McKenna, A Case Study of Child Abuse: A Former
Prosecutor's View, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 165, 174 (1974).
84. STANDARDS, supra note 33, pt. 9.1, Commentary, at 181.
85. See generally, MANUAL, supra note 2, at 147-48. Under present law,
where a petition alleging that a juvenile is abused or neglected has been filed, a
district court judge is required to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the
juvenile. In that limited circumstance, the judge may authorize the guardian ad
litem to "accompany the juvenile to court in any criminal action wherein he may
be called on to testify in a matter relating to abuse." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-586
(1981).
86. McCathren, supra note 35, at 719.
87. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 787 (1982).
88. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.33 (1981).
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clearest cases. s9 Many other factors, including a lack of legal services for petitioners and turnover among social workers, have contributed to delay in handling termination cases in the past.9
Although we have long held that the child's best interests is
our "guiding beacon" and "polar star" 91 to which "even parental
love must yield . . . ,",92we have focused on parental misconduct
rather than on specific harms to the child caused by such conduct.
A natural extension of that view has been a tendency to give the
parents "one more chance," since "only" another year or so would
be involved.9 3 That kindness to the parent has often been unintentional cruelty to the child involved. During a period of time which
might seem brief to a mature adult, a child may have formed new
attachments to foster parents as the memory of his parents
dimmed; further, the child may have resided in several foster
homes during that period, with an increasing sense of uneasiness
and uncertainty. When the stay stretches into three or four years,
the harmful effects on the child are multiplied and made
permanent.9 4
Our error has been in using an adult sense of time to determine what a reasonable period of time would be prior to requiring
either the return home of the child or the institution of a termination procedure.9 5 In order to insure that a child's sense of time is
used in making that crucial decision in the termination area, the
Committee focuses on adoption of standards directing the institution and expeditious handling of termination cases.9 6
89. HOME, supra note 13, at 62.
90. PROMISES, supra note 16, at 41.
91. In re Mongomery, 311 N.C. 101, 316 S.E.2d 246 (1984).

92. Wilson v. Wilson, 269 N.C. 676, 678, 153 S.E.2d 349, 351 (1967).
93. There is evidence that this attitude is changing. See, e.g., PROMISES,
supra note 16, at 42 ("In any event, it is clear that a great majority of the cases
brought for termination of parental rights result in the ultimate termination.
Data from the county surveys and the judges survey indicate that at least 80% of
all cases brought are successful.").
94. ENDANGERED CHILDREN, supra note 8, at iii-vii.
95. Id.; Wald, supra note 22, at 690, 695. Ketcham & Babcock, supra note
11, at 553:
What may seem an acceptable delay to an adult can be a profoundly
damaging period of loneliness and lovelessness to a child. Since the status of the child is the gravamen of the termination proceeding, that proceeding should be conducted according to the demands of a child's sense
of time, not an adult's.
96. Draft, supra note 53, at 17 ("The hearing on the terimination of parental
rights shall be conducted by the district court sitting without a jury and shall be
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The North Carolina Termination of Parental Rights Act, 7
contemplates a two-part proceeding:
during the adjudicatory stage, the petitioner must prove by clear,
cogent, and convincing evidence the existence of one or more of
the grounds for termination listed in G.S. § 7A-289.32. Once the
petitioner has proven this ground by this standard, it has met its
burden within the statutory scheme of G.S. §§ 7A-289.30(d) and
(e) and 7A-289.31(a). The petitioner having met his burden of
proof at the adjudication stage, the court then moves on to the
disposition stage, where the court's decision to terminate parental
rights is discretionary. 8
At all stages, the due process rights of all parties are protected by
provisions of the Act.99
The Committee recommends that when a juvenile cannot be
returned home at the end of the second or any subsequent review
hearing and a petition for termination of parental rights has not
been filed, the court shall direct the guardian ad litem and the petitioner to show why consideration of termination of parental
rights would not be in the juvenile's best interest. 100 A hearing on
the show cause order must be held within 90 days unless a petition
for termination of parental is filed earlier, or all the parties agree
in writing that consideration of termination would not be in the
juvenile's best interest. 10 1 If the court finds that it would be in the
best interest of the juvenile to consider termination, either the
guardian or petitioner may be required to file a petition for termi10 2
nation of parental rights within 15 days of the court order.
The time periods are not arbitrarily chosen, but represent the
weight of present authority.10 3 Since many are opposed to terminaheld within 90 days of the filing of the petition unless the court finds good cause
for delay.").
97. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-289.22 to -289.34 (1981).
98. In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 110, 316 S.E.2d 246, 252 (1984).
99. Id. at 108, 316 S.E.2d at 251.
100. Draft, supra note 53, at 14.
101. Id. at 15.
102. Id.
103. Areen, supra note 11, at 937, recommends that termination be considered where children under two have been out of the home six months, and where
children over two have been placed out of the home for one year, unless there is a
"reasonable possibility that the child will be reunited with his natural parents
within a reasonable time... ;" Wald, supra note 22, at 690-96 recommends con-

sideration of termination where children under three have been in foster care for
six months, and where children over three have been in care for one year or more;
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tion of parental rights under any circumstances, there will be vocal
opponents who will feel that too much haste is involved in using
these guidelines.1 0 4 It should be carefully noted, however, that the
court is not required to direct the filing of a petition for termination if such action would not be in the juvenile's best interest.1 05
Nor is termination mandated even if the court determines the existence of grounds for termination following a hearing.1 06
Further, a fixed time frame may also prove fairer to the parents in a potential termination situation. Experience has shown
that many parents are relatively indifferent to the progress of an
abuse or neglect case, particularly where the child has been in foster care for an extended period of time, until a petition for termination of their parental rights is filed. Thus in a recent case, the
respondent mother-after receiving notice of the termination petition-moved to a place in the country, resumed mental health
counselling, visted some with her children and gave them small
gifts, and enrolled at a technical college. 7 In another case, parents
moved to a clean apartment just prior to the institution of termination proceedings; however, the court held that that was not substantial progress in light of the filth in which the parents had lived
Ketcham & Babcock, supra note 11, at 554, recommend one year regardless of age
at time of removal; but see STANDARDS, supra note 33, pt. 8.3, Commentary, at
167 ("This standard does adopt the recommendation of several commentators of
having different time frames for children based on age. Being out of the home for
six months or even one year, however, is simply too brief to warrant termination
of parental rights.").
104. See, e.g., In re Phifer, 67 N.C. App. 16, 312 S.E.2d 684 (1984), where
the child had come into contact with the Department of Social Services on December 16, 1981, and had been removed from the home on January 20, 1982, because of the mother's alcoholism. The court found that no specific harm to the
child had been shown to have resulted from the mother's drinking problem, and
commented that
[o]ne of the most disturbing aspects of this case has been the apparent
haste with which petitioner has sought to terminate respondent's parental rights. Respondent has had custody of Walter for only two months; a
very short time in which to demonstrate her fitness as a parent. It is
clear, of course, that in some cases acts of neglect sufficient to support an
order terminating parental rights may occur in less than two months.
Id. at 27, 312 S.E.2d at 690.
105. Draft, supra note 53, at 14-15.
106. Id. at 18; In re Peirce, 53 N.C. App. 373, 389, 281 S.E.2d 198, 208
(1981).
107. In re Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 293 S.E. 2d 127, appeal dismissed sub. nom.

Moore v. Dept. of Social Services, 459 U.S. 1139 (1983).
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for the six previous years. 10 8 A system of fixed limits, attuned to
the child's sense of time, would prevent a parent from being lulled
asleep by the passage of time. Further, it must be stressed that this
legislation is an integrated whole, and under other provisions the
parents would be advised in writing soon after the removal of the
child from their home what actions they are expected to take to
resume custody. 09 At each review hearing, the court is required to
establish what services have been offered to the parents to remedy
the problem in the family causing harm to the child, and whether
reasonable efforts have been made to eliminate the need for placement. 1 0 Thus, the parents will be given all services available to
encourage their efforts to have their child returned home.
To further illustrate the wisdom of having the question of termination considered at fixed intervals, we need look no further
than our reported termination cases under the present caring, but
standardless, system. In In re Smith, the Durham County Department of Social Services had tried to assist the mother of two children for ten years. Sharon, born June 2, 1970, had been in the Department's custody for eight years when a termination proceeding
was initiated; her brother, Christopher, born December 12, 1972,
had been in the custody of the Department for six years at the
time of institution of the termination proceedings.
Testimony indicated that the children did not know who their
mother was, but that 'it is not uncommon for children who have
been in foster care to be confused about who their mother is'; that
Sharon had been moved five times and Christopher has been
moved three times; and that Sharon has spent ninety percent of
her life in foster care and Chris ninety-seven percent of his. The
children are both adoptable, although Sharon's emotional
problems may make her more difficult to place. 1 '
108. In re Wilkerson, 57 N.C. App. 63, 291 S.E.2d 182 (1982).
109. Draft, supra note 53, at 11:
In the case of any juvenile who is placed in the custody of the Department of Social Services, the Department shall prepare a specific, written
plan . . . within 30 days after the juvenile's actual removal . . . (which)
must indicate the following: ... (2) what steps will be taken to return the

juvenile home, including: (a) what services the parent, guardian or custodian will receive or be offered in order to enable them to resume custody,
and (b) actions the parent, guardian or custodian is exptected to take in
order to resume custody; ....

110. Draft, supra note 53, at 14.
111. In re Smith, 56 N.C. App. 142, 145, 287 S.E.2d 440, 442, cert. denied,
306 N.C. 385, 294 S.E.2d 212 (1982).
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The facts in In re Moore are similar: twin children, Donnie
and Connie, were born on July 27, 1968. Both had been in the custody of the Guilford County Department of Social Services since
December of 1974, although Donnie remained at home until April
of 1975. When parental rights were finally terminated by the District Court in January 1980, Donnie had been in six foster homes
and Connie in at least seven homes, in addition to North Carolina
Memorial Hospital for psychiatric treatment and in Thompson's
Childrens Home.112 Even in cases such as this, some are still reluctant to sever the parental connection. That is illustrated by Justice
Carlton's sharp dissent on the grounds that the majority condoned
a "horrible example of excessive governmental intrusion into the
affairs of family."'1 3
Similarly, in In re Apa, Judge Wells dissented from a decision
affirming the termination of parental rights where the father of a
child had never seen the child in eleven years, and furnished
no
4
support except for a bicycle when the child was six."

One of the grounds for termination under present North Carolina law centers around the failure of the parent to make "substantial progress" in correcting the conditions which led to the removal
of the child from the home during two consecutive years of foster
care." 5 In accord with the timetable of the proposed legislation,
the statute would be amended to require that substantial progress
be made within six months."' This is consistent with the thought
of both District Court Judges and child care professionals in the
state. In a recent survey, the county departments of social services
estimated that in an average time of 8.7 months, a determination
could be made as to whether a child was ever likely to return
home. Sixty-one percent of the judges responding to the survey felt
that one year or less was sufficient time for the consideration of
1
termination of parental rights.

For the practitioner and the parties, as well as the court, then,
it is important to realize that the review hearing would become a
major battle, not a skirmish. Counsel for parents will be well-advised to monitor his clients' progress during the entire time the
child is in foster care to insure their making a "positive response"
112. In re Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 293 S.E.2d 127 (1983).
113. Id. at 407, 293 S.E.2d at 134.
114. In re Apa, 59 N.C. App. 322, 296 S.E. 2d 811 (1982).
115. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.32(3) (1981).
116. Draft, supra note 53, at 18.
117. PROMISES, supra note 16, at 42-43.
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to the efforts of child care professionals, and to guarantee that services are provided the parents to enable them to deal with conditions in the home which led to the initial removal from the home.
This will be apparent since a new ground for termination is
proposed:
(8) The child was found to be endangered and was removed from
the custody of the parent pursuant to G.S. 7A-647.1(b); the child
has been placed outside of his home for more than one year; and
the court has determined at the second or any subsequent review
hearing required by G.S. 7A-657 that it was not in the child's best
interest to be returned to the custody of the parent.
An equally important amendment is made to an existing
ground, which is rewritten as follows:
(3) The parent has willfully left the child in foster care for more
than six consecutive months without making substantial progress
within six months in correcting those conditions which led to the
removal of the child or without showing positive response within
six months to the diligent efforts of a county Department of Social Services, a child-caring institution or licensed child-placing
agency to encourage the parent to strengthen the parental relationship to the child or to make and follow through with constructive planning for the future of the child. " 8
One who half-heartedly contested a determination that the
child not be returned home at the pertinent review hearing would
then find that that determination had become the grounds for termination. Note well that the court would apparently not be required to make extensive findings or hear extensive evidence at the
.adjudication stage of a termination proceeding where the petitioner proceeds under the proposed additional ground.
However, as mentioned above, the existence of one of the
grounds for termination does not require that the court issue such
an order. The draft legislation provides that the court shall issue
an order terminating the parental rights of such parent with respect to the child if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interest. The burden
of proof on the issue is placed on the petitioner. " 9
No standards are set forth in the present legislation for the
118. Draft, supra note 53, at 18-19. Present law requires a lapse of two years
without substantial progress or positive response having been made by the parent.
N.C. GEN. STAT. §7A-289.32(3)(1981).
119. Id. at 18.
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use or direction of the court in making a decision as to where the
best interest of the child lies in the dispositional phase of a termination proceeding. In an important recent decision, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the petitioner in a termination proceeding need not prove that the "intangible non-economic needs of
a child" (such as love, affection and other intangibles) are not met
in order to establish a ground for terminating parental rights. The
trial court may properly consider such factors in making its decision as to whether the best interest of the juvenile requires
termination.

12 0

The IJA/ABA Standards recognize that there are situations in
which termination should not be ordered, as it would "be deterimental to the child due to the strength of the parent-child relationship."' 1 No attempt is made in the Standards to give the court
a formula for determining the strength of such a relationship, but
it is suggested that the court consider the age of the child and the
length of time during which the child lived with the parents, the
strength of ties between the child and the foster parents who want
1 22
to adopt him, and the opinion of mental health professionals.
Most commentators would agree with the guidance recently
given by Justice Copeland, writing for the full North Carolina Supreme Court: "[in sum, where there is a reasonable hope that the
family unit within a reasonable period of time can reunite and provide for the emotional and physical welfare of the child, the trial
' 23
court is given discretion not to terminate rights.

1

To give the court guidance in exercising its discretion, the
draft legislation would require that the court consider, but not be
limited to, the following:
(1) The child's need for a permanent, legally secure home;
(2) Whether termination of parental rights is likely to lead to
a permanent placement for the child or to strengthen the child's
present placement;
(3) The nature of the child's relationship with the parent and
siblings and the effect of termination upon those or other important relationships; and
(4) The preferences of the child, according to the maturity and
120. In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 316 S.E.2d 246 (1984).
121. STANDARDS, supra note 33, pt. 8.4, Commentary, at 173.
122. Id. at 174.
123. In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 108, 316 S.E.2d 246, 251 (1984).
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firmness of the child's judgment.""
V.

POSTSCRIPT AND CAUTION

It is a grim truth that funds are not available to provide each
child with an "ideal" home. The North Carolina legislature, however, has always been a leader in the enactment and funding of
laws to protect and further the rights of children. It is hoped that
the draft legislation described herein will become another chapter
in that proud legislative heritage when submitted to the 1985 General Assembly for its consideration.
However, those content with easy solutions who feel that we
would have the problem of abuse and neglect well in hand with the
enactment of the proposed legislation would be well-advised to reread the words of Mason P. Thomas, Jr.:
The phenomenon of child abuse and maltreatment is deeply
rooted in our cultural and religious history. It is as old as civilization itself. Yet the fact of child abuse has remained largely hidden and suppressed. Reform movements have pointed out the
horrors being committed upon children and attempt[s] to provide
some protection have occurred at intervals, but in time the shocking facts of mistreatment seem always to have been avoided or
12 5
forgotten.
As significant and far-reaching as the Committee's Report is,
areas remain to be developed. As suggested above, the procedure
for determining when criminal charges should be filed in dealing
with intra-family situations involving abuse, and how the child can
be protected once such charges are filed, must be developed and
hard decisions must be made as to the advisability of even using
the criminal courts in some cases. There should be minimum levels
of training for all personnel, including the courts, who are decisionmakers in endangerment cases. The present state of the medical arts should be fully used to devleop guidelines for diagnosing
the potential abuser. Considering the urgency of the interests involved in termination cases, the feasibility of expedited appeals
should be studied. Finally, a concentrated effort to provide necessary funds must be made by the legislature if we are to make services available which will allow children to remain in their homes.
Increased financial support will also be necessary if we are to in124. Draft, supra, note 53, at 18.
125. Thomas, supra note 2, at 293.
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crease the level of reward for career social workers, to reduce turnover and to insure continuity in these crucial cases.
We must resolve neither to avoid nor to forget. Our greatest
natural resource-our children-hangs in the balance.
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APPENDIX

SUMMARY OF PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO
IMPLEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE GACCY COMMITTEE ON FOSTER CARE
STANDARDS*
I.

Juvenile Code

Article 41. Purpose; definitions.
The definitions of "abused juvenile and "neglected juvenile"
are retained, with some rewording, including new wording for sexual abuse. The definition of "dependent juvenile" is unchanged. A
definiton of "endangered juvenile" is added; it is more restrictive
than "abused" or "neglected" and focuses on actual harm to the
child or a substantial risk of harm to the child. This definition determines when removal from the home is an available disposition.
Article 42. Jurisdiction.
Provisions are added (1) giving the court jurisdiction over parents, guardians, custodians, or caretakers who are alleged to have
refused to allow or cooperate in a required DSS investigation, and
(2) specifying the court's jurisdiction for review hearings that are
already statutorily required and for reviews of voluntary
placements.
Article 44; Screening of Abuse and Neglect Complaints.
Services that DSS is required to provide include reasonable
efforts to protect children in their own home and voluntary services to respond to requests for casework and other services to preserve, improve, and stabilize family life.
DSS may seek a court order directing a parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker to cooperate in an investigation of alleged
abuse or neglect, and such orders may be enforced by contempt.
With exceptions for cases in which the child cannot be protected,
DDS must offer services to address the cause of endangerment
without removing the child from the home.
Article 45. Venue; petition; summons.
When a petition is filed in a district other than the district of
the juvenile's residence, any party may move for transfer to the
district of the juvenile's residence.
*Prepared by Janet Mason, Assistant Director of the Institute of Government, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (February, 1985).
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DDS is still authorized to file petitions alleging that a juvenile
is dependent, abused, or neglected. "Endangerment" is not a new
jurisdictional category, but is a standard for removal at the disposition stage.
The juvennile summons is changed to include a notice about
the nature and seriousness of the proceeding.
Article 46. Temporary custody; secure and non-secure custody;
custody hearings.
When a juvenile appears to be endangered solely as a result of
being left unattended, a DDS worker or law enforcement officer
may provide an emergency caretaker until the parent returns or
until it appears that the parent does not intend to return home.
At a 5-day or 7-day hearing to determine the need for continued non-secure custody, an order continuing such custody (1) must
include findings as to whether reasonable efforts have been made
to prevent or eliminate the need for placement, and (2) may provide for services or other efforts aimed at returning the juvenile
home promptly.
Article 51. Hearing procedures.
The granting of continuances is limited.
Article 52. Dispositions.
Dispositional sections are reorganized and a section is added
to address any category of juvenile that is placed in the custody of
a county department of social services.
Removal from the home is a dispositional alternative for an
abused, neglected, or dependent juvenile only if the juvenile is
found to be endangered.
Before placing custody of an endangered juvenile with anyone
other than the parent or guardian, the court must find that removal is necessary to protect the juvenile from further endangerment. An order removing custody of the juvenile from the parent
or guardian must include findings as to whether reasonable efforts
were made to prevent or eliminate the need for removal.
Whenever a juvenile is placed in the custody of DDS, the department must provide the court with a specific, written plan regarding the child's placement and services to the child and parents. Any dispute regarding the plan will be resolved by the court.
Provisions regarding the authority of DDS to consent to medical
treatment and other matters affecting a juvenile in its custody are
clarified.
Dispositional alternatives for undisciplined or delinquent
juveniles are revised so that (1) placement with DDS is an option
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol7/iss2/2
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only if the juvenile is found to need placement because he is not
receiving adequate care, adequate supervision, or adequate discipline, and (2) except in an emergency, before placement of such
juvenile in the custody of DDS, the director of DDS must be made
a party and be given notice and an opportunity to be heard.
The provisions of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-657 for the review of
custody orders are substantially revised:
1. Review hearings are to be conducted every 6 months.
2. Review hearings may be waived or held less frequently for
juveniles in stable placements, but any party may require that a
review hearing be held.
3. At the first review hearing for an abused, neglected, or dependent juvenile the court must return the juvenile to the home
unless it finds by clear and convincing evidence that it is not in the
juvenile's best interest to be returned home. At a second review,
the juvenile must be returned unless the court finds that the juvenile will be endangered if returned home. The burden of proof is
on the petitioner. If the juvenile is not returned home after the
second hearing and a petition for termination of parental rights
has not been filed, the petitioner and guardian ad litem must be
directed to show cause why consideration of termination of parental rights is not in the juvenile's best interest. A hearing will be
held within 90 days unless a termination petition has been filed or
all parties have agreed that consideration of termination is not in
the juvenile's best interest. At a 90-day hearing, the court may direct the filing of a petition for termination of parental rights. The
next review hearing will be held 6 months from the date of the
hearing.
Procedures are added for the court to review the placements
of juveniles, who are in DDS foster care pursuant to voluntary
agreements, within 180 days of the juvenile's placement and to
conduct subsequent reviews if the juvenile is not returned home.
II.

Termination of Parental Rights

It is specified that the goal of termination of parental rights is
adoptive placement.
A guardian ad litem is authorized to petition for termination if
he or she has served for 6 months (now, one year).
The adjudicatory hearing is to be held within 90 days of the
filing of the petition unless the court finds good cause for delay.
The petitioner has the burden of proof at the adjudicatory and dispositonal hearings.
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The grounds for termination are modified as follows:
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.32(2) ("The parent has abused or
neglected the child.") is repealed.
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.32(3) is amended to change from 2
years to 6 months the length of time the child is in foster care
without the parent's making substantial progress to correct conditions or showing positive response to DDS or other ageny's efforts.
3. A new ground provides for termination when the child was
removed from the parent's custody because of endangerment; the
child has been placed for more than one year; and the court has
determined at the second or any subsequent review hearing that it
is not in the child's best interest to be returned home.
Other grounds for termination are not changed.
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